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Gender, income, education and self-employment are robust predictors for individual support for 
redistribution in the OECD. In addition, considerations of social status, the fairness of the allocation 
mechanism, perceived moral worth of the poor and individual autonomy are important. The results for 
the OECD are compared to those for a large sample of non-OECD countries which also include less 
developed economies. Neither gender, nor self-employment, nor fairness considerations exhibit a robust 
association with preferences for redistribution. However, education, income, individual autonomy and 
moral worth of the poor remain important determinants. On average, preferences for redistribution 
indicate that within the OECD, there is no desire to change redistributive policies. In contrast, in the 
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1. Introduction 
 
Government social spending greatly varies across countries. For OECD countries in 
2007, social expenditure as percentage of GDP was as high as 27.3% in Sweden and 25.2% in 
Germany, and as low as 7.2% in Mexico and 7.5% in South-Korea. Why are countries so 
different with respect to the resources they use for social expenditure? There are certainly a 
multitude of economic, historic, legal and cultural factors determining the extent of state 
social spending (e.g. Becker 1983, Persson and Tabellini 1999, Shelton 2007). Still, in a 
democracy, the preferences of the electorate should also have an important effect on 
redistributive policies of the state. Assuming that the extent of state social spending is to a 
large degree driven by the electorate’s preferences, a better understanding of the determinants 
of these preferences is necessary in order to understand cross country differences.  
The present analysis shows that income, education, social class and beliefs in self-
determination have a significant effect on preferences for income equality throughout the 
world. Preferences for income inequality, which are interpreted as preferences for 
redistribution, are analyzed for OECD and non-OECD countries separately, overall 
comprising more than 350,000 observations from 100 countries. The contribution of the 
present paper to the empirical literature on determinants for individual preferences for 
redistribution is twofold. On the one hand, the analysis includes data for more countries over 
a longer period of time than used in this type of analysis so far. On the other hand this study 
tries to simultaneously test various determinants of redistributive preferences, which so far 
have been mainly tested individually. If each hypothesis being tested individually finds 
empirical support, this implies that each individual analysis suffers from missing variables 
bias. Also substitutive and complementary relations between the determinants are 
unaccounted for. It is the rule rather than the exception of empirical work with pre-existing 
data that not all relevant questions can be answered simultaneously with a given data set. This 
is also true for the present study. While it succeeds in grouping hypotheses that so far have 
been answered separately, there are a number of important determinants identified in the 
literature, which can not be considered, since no information is provided in the data used. 
Respondents’ race, the ethnic composition of the home community and past and future 
expected social mobility are examples of determinants that have been proven important for 
preferences of redistribution but cannot be accounted for with the data used in this paper. 
The next section will discuss theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature 
on what determines preferences for redistribution. In section 3 some general methodological   3
issues will be discussed. Also the dependent variables most commonly used in the literature 
as proxy for preferences for redistribution will be reviewed. Section 4 will introduce the data 
set and present the empirical strategy of the present analysis. In section 5 the results for the 
sample of OECD countries will be presented and discussed. Also a wide array of robustness 
checks will be considered. In section 6 the result for the non-OECD sample will be presented. 
Finally, section 7 wraps up the results and concludes.  
   
2. Determinants for Preferences for Redistribution 
 
The present section discusses the theoretical arguments and empirical analysis of 
preferences for redistribution in the literature. I will refer heavily to Corneo (2004) and 
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) who provide a selective and thorough review of some of the 
most important contributions. For analytical clearness, I follow Corneo (2004) in categorizing 
the determinants for redistribution in three groups. The first group comprises the individual 
and socio-economic characteristics that shape material self-interest. The second group refers 
to interdependent preferences which result in distributional externalities. The third and final 
group captures beliefs about a fair or just world and individual responsibility.
1  
An individual is expected to vote for redistribution if her disposable income increases 
with redistribution. This logic is implied in the models of Romer (1975), Robert (1977) and 
Meltzer and Richard (1981). Since the distance between median and mean income rises with 
rising inequality, the median voter’s preferred level of redistribution rises with income 
inequality.
2 Net gains from redistribution are inversely related to income. In empirical work 
either absolute or relative individual or household income is used to account for this effect. 
For example Corneo (2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002) and Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) 
use relative individual income, while Alesina and Giuliano (2009), Fong (2001), Luttmer 
(2001) and Murthi and Tiongson (2009) use absolute income levels or categories of income 
levels in their respective empirical specifications. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) use the real 
value of household consumption as a proxy for current economic welfare. 
Not only current income but also lifetime income and thus the possibility of upward 
and downward social mobility will be considered by a rational actor when determining the 
individually optimal level of income redistribution. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), Piketty 
(1995) and Benbeou and Ok (2001) analyze how prospects, observations or experience of 
                                                 
1 Note that fairness can also be understood as a variety of interdependent preferences.  
2 This reasoning implies that more unequal societies should experience higher levels of redistribution. The 
empirical test and explanations why the hypothesis is mostly rejected have produced a large body of research.   4
income mobility might affect the individual desire for redistribution.
3 A proxy for life-time 
income is educational attainment which, to the best of my knowledge, is included in basically 
every empirical analysis of preferences for redistribution. Actual mobility experience is 
mostly measured by comparison of the respondents own standard of living, level of income, 
educational attainment or occupational status with those of her parents (Corneo 2001, Corneo 
und Grüner 2002, Alesina and Giuliano 2009). Alesina and LaFerrara (2005) use panel 
income data to construct a measure of expected future income. They also use a survey item 
from the General Social Survey (GSS) which states that “… people like me […] have a good 
chance of improving our standard of living…”. This question simultaneously refers to the 
respondents prospects of social mobility and the functioning and fairness of the economic 
system. Both, social mobility and beliefs about the allocation mechanism in society are 
important determinants and are often treated jointly. In the present paper both issues will be 
treated separately. The beliefs about the fairness of the market system will be discussed 
below. 
There are a number of socio-economic characteristics like labour-market status and 
marriage status that influence the material payoffs associated with income redistribution. 
Often these characteristics are only included to control for possible missing variable bias. 
However, since this paper wants to provide a comprehensive view on the determinants of 
preferences for income equality, they are included in the discussion.  
The unemployed are excluded from the labour market and in general earn no or little 
market income. They are expected to receive higher transfers if more income is redistributed 
and accordingly prefer more redistribution. In addition, the experience of unemployment 
could constitute a major trauma. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) argue that negative life events 
might induce more risk-aversion or reduce optimistic beliefs about upward mobility and 
empirically show a statistical positive and significant effect of such adverse life events on the 
willingness to redistribute.  
Aspects of material self-interest extend beyond direct pecuniary effects and include 
insurance effects. Among others, Varian (1980) and Sinn (1995) show that income 
redistribution in the welfare state constitutes social insurance against income risks. For the 
self-employed, it is often argued that they are less risk averse and thus demand less insurance 
against income shocks as it is provided by a redistributive system of taxes and transfers 
(Guillaud 2008, Alesian and LaFerrara 2005). Accordingly, the self-employed should prefer 
                                                 
3 The categorization of social mobility is contested; e.g. Corneo (2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002) take 
social mobility and related perceptions on the fairness of the marketplace together as effects of public values as 
opposed to material self-interest.    5
less redistribution. Corneo (2004) cautions that the interpretation of self-employment as a 
proxy for low risk-aversion is very ad-hoc. Ceteris paribus the demand for insurance against 
income risks could also be higher since the self-employed experience higher income 
volatility. 
Marriage is the foundation for the family, which traditionally used to be the 
fundamental insurance provider in case of sickness or unemployment. As such the family 
constitutes a basic insurance mechanism. The insurance effect of marriage is discussed in 
Hess (2004). Accordingly, a married individual should have a lower demand for social 
insurance as compared to a single individual, since marriage provides some form of insurance 
against labour market risks. Individuals living in marriage should exhibit lower preferences 
for redistribution. 
The insurance argument also applies for religion. Religious communities provide 
solace and often even material compensation in the case of adverse life events. While the 
insurance effect of religion might vary with denomination, the central hypothesis is that 
religious individuals of all denominations have a substitute for social insurance and 
accordingly demand less of it (Clarke and Lelkes 2005, Deheja et al. 2007). The inverse 
relation between religiosity and intensity of preferences for social insurance is empirically 
substantiated by Scheve and Stasavage (2006).  
The aforementioned characteristics influence an individual’s material well-being, not 
only in a pecuniary sense, but also in the sense of providing optimal levels of insurance. 
However, Fong et al. (2005) show that individual motives for income redistribution can not be 
fully explained by selfishly rational determinants alone. Instead they propose that “strong 
reciprocity”
4 is the reason why people support the welfare state
5. Since strong reciprocity is an 
unfamiliar concept, I will proceed to disentangle the concept into interdependent preferences 
and beliefs about fairness and individual responsibility.  
Corneo (2004) identifies two channels for interdependencies between actors for 
externalities to arise: status concerns and altruism. In a matching model where an agent’s 
individual income determines his marriage prospects, Corneo and Grüner (2000) derive the 
social rivalry effect: even individuals that would profit from income redistribution may 
oppose it, because income redistribution would also improve the income position of poorer 
individuals, thereby increasing the competition in the marriage market and reducing the 
chance of a good match. Corneo (2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002) use individual 
                                                 
4 „Strong reciprocity is a propensity to share and cooperate with others similarly disposed, even at personal cost, 
and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is 
personally costly and cannot be expected to entail net personal gains in the future” (Fong et al. 2005, p. 285). 
5 On reciprocity see Sobel (2005).   6
occupational prestige scores they match to income groups to show the empirical relevance of 
the social rivalry effect.   
A related issue to social rivalry is social identity. Shayo (2009) constructs a model of 
social identity and shows the existence of an equilibrium in which members of the lower class 
identify with the nation as a whole and vote for less redistribution as compared to the optimal 
level given their class interest alone. He also provides empirical support for the social identity 
hypothesis using the same data as the present study. Klor and Shayo (2010) experimentally 
study the effect of social identity on redistributive preferences and show that identification 
with a group can counteract individual pecuniary interest in the selection of redistributive 
schemes.
6  
Luttmer (2001) analyses the effect of group loyalty on the taste for redistribution. 
What he terms group loyalty could also be framed as racial identity and accordingly be related 
to the just discussed effects of social identity. In Luttmer’s approach group membership is 
defined by race. He empirically shows that racial group loyalty increases the demand for 
redistribution as the share of welfare recipients from the in-group in the community rises. At 
the same time there is an exposure effect: welfare support decreases with a rising number of 
recipients in the community. Luttmer’s contribution is part of a larger literature that analyzes 
the effects of ethnic and racial diversity on economic performance in general (see Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2005) and on redistributive preferences especially. The literature on ethnic 
diversity and support for redistribution is reviewed by Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 
(forthcoming). While for the U.S. there is some agreement on a pure race effect, the effect of 
ethnical heterogeneity and fractionalization for attitudes toward redistribution is contested. 
Most studies that rely on observational data only provide weak or no evidence for an effect of 
ethnic heterogeneity on preferences for redistribution. These studies report correlations and 
statistical associations but can not determine causation. Dahlberg et al. (2011) use a nation-
wide policy intervention that produced an exogenous variation in immigrant shares in 
communities across Sweden, to identify the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on natives’ 
preferences for redistribution. They find, “that an increasing share of immigrants leads to 
lower preferred levels of social benefits. This negative effect on preferences for redistribution 
is especially pronounced for individuals in the upper tail of the income and wealth 
distributions.” (p. 29). Fong and Luttmer (2009) provide experimental evidence for the effect 
of racial group loyalty on charitable giving, using a large representative sample of the 
American population. They find no effect of race per se, but strong effects for those 
                                                 
6 A related, but theoretically not substantiated argument is presented by Solt (2011). He states that nationalism is 
consciously used to accommodate the poor with larger income differences.   7
respondents that identify with their respective group and conclude that “subjective racial 
identification is a stronger predictor of racial bias in giving than the objective race of the 
respondent” (p. 85). The same authors use a similar experiment to disentangle the effects of 
fairness and race (Fong and Luttmer 2011). They show that fairness considerations of donors 
depend on perceptions of moral worthiness of recipients, i.e. “beliefs about whether or not the 
poor are individually responsible for their own bad outcomes, […] whether the poor are lazy 
or industrious” (p. 372). No direct effect of race or racial composition is found. However, the 
experiment shows that worthiness perceptions are racially biased.  
  In the following influence of perceptions of moral worth of welfare recipients, 
individual responsibility in shaping life events and beliefs about the fairness of societal 
allocation mechanisms will be considered. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Alesina and 
Angeletos (2005) show how beliefs in the fairness of the allocation system in a society 
(beliefs in a “just society”) can account for large differences in redistributive policies. 
Fairness beliefs refer to the perceived relation between effort and compensation, income or 
success. A system is considered just or fair, if individual responsibility, i.e. individual effort 
and not luck or family background determine outcomes. Naturally, these beliefs also influence 
the expectations about own future income and prospective social mobility. Fong (2006) uses 
quantitative sensitivity analysis to disentangle whether the effect of beliefs in a fair society on 
redistributive preferences works through the expectation of own upward mobility or through 
the belief in moral worthiness of respondents. She finds the latter explanation to be more 
robust. Most empirical work using survey data tries to account for these beliefs. Corneo 
(2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002) include an item in their analysis asking respondents for 
the importance of hard work and a wealthy family background for getting ahead in life. 
Variables capturing beliefs about the importance of family background, luck and hard work 
for social upward mobility are also included by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Fong 
(2001).
7 These results have been substantiated by a series of economic experiments. Fong 
(2007) shows that altruistic giving is conditioned on the apparent worthiness of the recipients. 
Durante and Putterman (2007) find that the support for redistribution is lower if the initial 
distribution is determined by the performance in a task. In an experiment performed by 
Krawczyk (2010), redistributive transfers dropped by 20% if task performance and not luck 
determined outcomes. However, if outcomes were determined by luck, the distribution of 
winning probabilities of the underlying lottery did not have an effect on levels of 
redistribution. Rey-Biel et al. (2011) confirm the importance of fairness beliefs and in 
                                                 
7  For a discussion see Corneo (2004).   8
addition show that the priors of these fairness beliefs differ across countries. If the income 
generating process is unknown to experimental subjects, in the U.S. bad outcomes are 
attributed to a lack of effort while in Spain bad luck is perceived as the decisive reason.  
Bavetta et al. (2007) and Patti and Navarra (2010) embrace the importance of fairness 
beliefs for the support for redistribution. However, they argue that fairness beliefs themselves 
are endogenous and to a large degree depend on the perception of individual freedom and 
autonomy. If individuals belief that they are in control of their life, they also tend to accept the 
outcomes as fair and accordingly will have weaker preferences for redistribution. 
 
3. Methodological issues and hypothesis formulation 
 
In the present subsection some methodological issues will be discussed. Firstly, some 
general problems with survey data will be pointed out. Secondly, the dependent variable used 
to analyze preferences for redistribution will be discussed and compared to other measures 
used in the literature.  
While survey data is increasingly being used by economists, there is still some concern 
regarding data quality and the reliability of self-reported outcomes and attitudes. As pointed 
out by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) there are framing-, priming- and interviewer bias, to 
name just the most likely sources of bias, prevalent in individual survey data. However, it is 
unlikely that similar framing and priming biases pertain across different surveys. For 
empirical findings based on survey data it is thus desirable to reproduce results across 
different data sets using similar items. The dependent variable, in the present case the implicit 
or explicit stated preference for redistribution, is in general operationalized differently across 
data sets. While this might seem like an obstacle to comparability, the reproduction of 
qualitative results with only similar but not the same dependent variables in fact corroborate 
the underlying relation: respective results are obviously robust to the formulation of the 
dependent variable. 
In Table 1 there is an overview over the items used in the research on preferences for 
redistribution. While not exhaustive, the most important measures are presented. The first two 
items simply ask about the government reducing income differences. Question (1) from the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) does neither provide a reference level nor an 
implied trade-off. In contrast, the wording of the European Social Survey (ESS) item (2) 
seems to suggest that the actual income differences present in the surveyed country should be 
reduced. The ESS measure also lacks an implied trade-off. Item three from the General Social 
Survey (GSS) also refers to the reduction of income differences by the government. The   9
wording suggest that people should refer to the actual given income difference in their 
country. The question also details how such a redistributive policy could be financed. 
Question (5) from the GSS asks about the appropriate extend of welfare spending with 
reference to the given situation. The item (4) from the GSS and item (7) from the World 
Values Survey (WVS) do not refer directly to redistributive policies and pecuniary transfers. 
Instead they evaluate the appropriate relation between the state and its citizens and the degree 
of self-responsibility. Both items obviously refer to the given situation.   
  
Table 1. Overview: survey items used to measure preferences for redistribution 
Data  Item  used in publications 
(1) 
ISSP  
“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes 
and those with low incomes.”  
(1) “Strongly agree” to (5) “Strongly disagree” 
Corneo (2001);  Corneo and 




“The government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels?". 
 (1)“Agree strongly" to (5) “Disagree strongly" 
Rueda and Pontusson (2010);  
Luttmer and Singhal (2010); 
Jaeger (2008); Senik et al. 
(2009); Lübker (2007) 
(3) 
GSS 
“Some people think that the government in Washington 
ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and 
the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or 
by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that 
the government should not concern itself with reducing this 
income difference between the rich and the poor".  
(1) ”Should" to (7) ”Should not" 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); 




“Some people think that the government in Washington 
should do everything to improve the standard of living of all 
poor Americans (they are at point 1 on this card). Other 
people think it is not the government’s responsibility, and 
that each person should take care of himself (they are at 
point 5). Where are you placing yourself in this scale?” 
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) 
[They claim that Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2005 and many others 




“Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right 
amount on welfare?” 
Luttmer (2001); Alesina and La 




“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. 
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; 
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can 
choose any number in between. Sentences: 
’Incomes should be made more equal’ (1) vs. ’We need 
larger income differences as incentives’ (10).” 
Murthi and Tiongson (2008)
8; 




"Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. 
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; 
and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can 
choose any number in between. ’People should take more 
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) 
 
                                                 
8 Murthi and Tiongson (2008) provide an overview over data sets used to analyze the socialist legacy with 
respect to redistributive preferences in member countries of the former Soviet Union.   10
responsibility to provide for themselves’ (1) 
vs. ’The government should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for’ (10).” 
Note: ISSP (International Social Survey Program); GSS (General Social Survey Program); ESS (European 
Social Survey); WVS (World Values Survey) 
 
Finally, item (6) from the WVS is the main dependent variable in the present paper. The 
question clearly refers to the status quo and does not only ask whether income differences 
should be reduced, but also allows for the possibility of larger income differences. However, 
with referring to “larger income differences as incentives” the question does not only elicit 
preferences about the desirable income distribution, but also includes beliefs about the 
efficiency cost of redistribution. It could be argued that by mentioning incentives in the 
context of larger income differences, respondents are somewhat primed on the efficiency 
costs of redistribution, probably biasing downward the reported desire for more equal 
incomes. The question does not mention policies or associated costs. It is thus more a 
question on the preference for income equality than for income redistribution. However, since 
redistribution is not the only, but certainly the most common policy of achieving more equal 
income distributions, the items is taken as an indirect measure for preferences of 
redistribution. 
  
3.2. Hypothesis Formulation 
We will now formulate the central hypotheses and introduce the respective variables.
9 
As discussed in section 2 there are a number of individual characteristics which have a direct 
influence on individual self-interest in a narrow sense. Individuals with higher incomes will 
have to contribute more and accordingly prefer less redistribution.  
H1: With rising income, support for redistribution diminishes. 
There are five income dummies indicating an individual’s gross household income 
(inc_quint1- inc_quint5). The third quintile will be used as reference category. Accordingly, 
lower quintiles (1, 2) should have a positive, higher quintiles (4, 5) a negative effect on the 
support for redistribution.  
Educational levels are a proxy for lifetime income with more education increasing lifetime 
income.  
H2: With higher educational achievements, the support for redistribution diminishes.   
There are five dummies indicating educational achievement (edu_no-edu_uni). No education 
is the reference category. Accordingly, every educational level should have a negative effect 
on the preference for redistribution.  
                                                 
9 Summary statistics are presented in Table 4 below. Variable coding is detailed in Appedix II, Table B1.   11
Insurance effects are also considered to reflect self-interested behaviour. The self-employed 
should have lower risk-aversion and accordingly demand less social insurance against income 
shocks. 
H3: The self-employed have weaker preferences for redistribution. 
There are a number of job-status dummies. The reference category is full employment. The 
dummy indicating self-employment is called jobstat_self and should have a negative effect on 
the preference for redistribution. 
Marriage was also considered as a basic insurance scheme. A married person should demand 
lower levels of social insurance and accordingly less redistribution. 
H4: The married have weaker preferences for redistribution. 
The marriage status is indicated by four dummies (stat_) with being single being the reference 
category. The dummy for being married, stat_married, should have a negative effect on the 
support for redistribution.  
The insurance argument is also applied in the context of religion. Religious people have some 
substitute for social insurance and accordingly should demand less of it. 
H5: Being religious diminishes the support for redistribution. 
Religiosity is measured using the frequency of church attendance. Three dummies are coded 
with never visiting religious services as base category. The dummies religion_some and 
religion_reg indicate some and regular attendance to religious services.  
We now proceed to the augmented hypotheses using additional focus variables. 
The social rivalry effect states that individuals might oppose redistribution because it 
might jeopardize their position in the social hierarchy. This effect is captured by including 
self-reported social class of the respondents. 
H6: The higher the social class, the lower the preference for redistribution.    
Social class is captured by four dummies with the working class (class_working) as reference 
category. Belonging to the middle and upper class (class_middle, class_upper) should have a 
negative effect, belonging to the lower class (class_lower) a positive effect on the preferences 
for redistribution. Social class is a coarse measure to capture the social rivalry effect. Some 
problems will be discussed in the results section (section 5).  
The argument based on social identity states that nationalism (i.e. a strong/stronger 
identification with the nation) might moderate class interest.  
H7: Higher levels of national pride come with low preferences for redistribution.   12
The dummy proud_bin1 indicates respondents which are very proud to be citizens of their 
respective nation. Accordingly, proud_bin1 should have a negative effect on the preference 
for redistribution. 
It has already been discussed that the categorization of the variable measuring an individual’s 
belief about the relation of work and success is ambivalent. The variable could indicate 
fairness considerations, but it could also proxy beliefs about individual possibilities for 
upward mobility.  
H8a: The belief that hard work will result in success will diminish the support for 
redistribution. 
H8b: The belief that success is a matter of luck will increase the support for 
redistribution. 
The original ten point Likert-scaled variable is recoded in three dummies. The reference 
category is made up of all individuals indicating non-extreme values (3 to 8). The dummy 
success_work indicates the belief that effort results in success and accordingly should have a 
negative effect. The opposite belief, captured by the dummy success_luck should have a 
positive effect on the preference for redistribution.  
The belief in the moral worth of recipients and the fairness of the social distribution system is 
captured by a question about the reasons for being poor.  
H9a: Respondents who believe that being poor is caused by laziness have weaker 
preferences for redistribution. 
H9b: Respondents who believe that being poor is caused by an unfair society have 
stronger preferences for redistribution. 
The dummy poor_lazy indicates the belief that the poor are poor because of laziness. On the 
other hand poor_unfair indicates that the reason for poverty is an unfair society.  
A related item asks about the control in life.  While this question is not related to poverty, it 
evaluates whether respondents feel responsible for their actions and associated outcomes. It 
seem very likely that respondents project their self-evaluation on other, i.e. if they feel 
responsible for their outcomes, they also belief that others are responsible too.  
H10a: Respondents who feel in control of their life have a lower preference for 
redistribution. 
H10b: Respondents who do not feel in control of their life have a higher preference for 
redistribution. 
The original ten-point Likert-scaled variable is recoded. There is one dummy indicating the 
feeling of control (control_yes) and another one indicating the absence of this feeling   13
(control_no). Following hypothesis H10, control_no is expected to have a positive and 
control_yes a negative effect on the preferences for redistribution. 
If altruism is directed toward the poor, the altruistic individual will experience an increase in 
utility if the position of the poor is improved. Since redistribution raises the income of the 
poor, an altruistic individual should have a higher probability to redistribute. 
H11: More altruistic individuals have stronger preferences for redistribution. 
There is no direct measure for altruism. Accordingly, the dummy child_unselfish is used to 
proxy for altruism. The dummy child_unselfish indicates that the respondent finds 
unselfishness and important child quality. This dummy should have a positive effect on the 
preference for redistribution. 
Finally, gender differences in redistributive preferences should be considered. Empirical 
research consistently shows gender differences in risk aversion and altruism (Andreoni and 
Versterlund 2001, Gneezy et al. 2009). Women are generally found to be more risk averse and 
more altruistic. Higher risk aversion increases the demand for social insurance.  
H12: Women have stronger preferences for redistribution. 
Gender is measured with the dummy female, indicating the respondent to be a woman. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
4.1. Data 
The individual level data is taken from the European Value Studies and the World 
Values Survey, together referred to as WVS. The World Values Survey Network provides a 
harmonized file of European – and World Values Surveys (WVS 2009), extending over five 
survey waves carried out around 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.
10 In addition, the 
European Values Survey 2008 provides a sixth round of survey data (EVS 2010).
11 In each 
wave the survey has been conducted over a period of about three years. The individual level 
data from the WVS is augmented with macroeconomic data from the OECD (OECD 2008) 
and the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, WDI 2011). The Gini coefficient of 
household adult-equivalent gross- and net income is included to characterize the income 
distribution. Income distribution data is taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Data set (SWIID, SWIID 2009).
12 All macro data is matched to each observation according to 
                                                 
10 For details see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
11 More information on the EVS at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/. 
12 The SWIID and details are provided at http://www.siuc.edu/~fsolt/swiid/swiid.html   14
the country and year the survey was conducted. In general the year is the time point of 
reference.
13 
I analyze the statistical relation between the preferences for redistribution and a host of 
individual and country specific characteristics. The preference for redistribution is elicited 
with the following survey item: 
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your 
views on this scale? 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 1 
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall 
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: 
’Incomes should be made more equal’ (10) vs. ’We need larger income differences as 
incentives’ (1).” 
The original variable was recoded so that higher values indicate a stronger preference for 
equal incomes, i.e. a stronger preference for redistribution. The dependent variable is 
accordingly named equal_income. The distribution of responses is reported in Table 2 
Table 2. Distribution of dependent variable equal_income 
equal_income Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
      
incentives to individual effort 1  16,237  10.01  10.01 
2 9,460  5.83  15.83 
3 22,495  13.86  29.7 
4  18,539 11.42 41.12 
5 14,455  8.91  50.03 
6  21,394 13.18 63.21 
7 12,942  7.98  71.19 
8  14,950 9.21 80.4 
9 10,563  6.51  86.91 
 incomes more equal 10  21,246  13.09  100 
      
Total  162,281 100   
Note: Sample of 34 OECD countries 
 
In a first step the sample is restricted to the 34 OECD countries. Table 3 shows the 
mean of equal_income by country and wave. The data set contains a total of 200,996 
observations for the OECD. Valid information for the dependent variable equal_income is 
available for 162,281 observations. The mean value of equal_income over all observations is 
5.51 and thus basically the median value (5.5). A possible interpretation is that on average 
people are happy with the distribution of incomes in the OECD. This interpretation does not 
consider substantial variation across countries. The mean preference for redistribution is 
strongest in Israel (1. rank) and Switzerland (2. rank) and has the lowest levels in Denmark 
                                                 
13 Every survey wave was conducted over a period of about three years (for details see Appendix I, Table A1). 
For ease of exposition, we just present country-wave tables.   15
(34. rank) and Poland (33. rank). However, a lot of country averages are close to the median 
value. 
 
Table 3. Mean of equal-income by country and wave 
country  \  wave  1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2004 2005-2008 2008-2009  Total 
        
Australia  . 5.405 . 5.330 . 5.375 
Austria  5.565 . 6.439 . 7.519  6.514 
Belgium  5.080 . 5.496 . 5.388  5.285 
Canada  4.217 . 5.664  5.352 . 5.118 
Chile  4.999 5.795 6.979 6.217  .  5.933 
Czech Republic  4.126  4.797  5.513 . 6.338 5.060 
Denmark  4.482 .  .  . 4.094  4.250 
Estonia  3.228  5.481  4.119 . 5.147  4.581 
Finland  4.384 6.842 6.398 6.020 6.384 6.158 
France  5.736  .  6.149 5.957 5.778 5.922 
Germany  4.251 6.053  .  6.604 7.097 5.755 
Greece  . . . .  6.546  6.546 
Hungary 5.186  7.199  .  .  6.379  6.180 
Iceland  5.295 . 5.342 . 5.629  5.422 
Ireland  4.614 . 4.888 . 5.849  5.105 
Israel . .  7.229  . .  7.229 
Italy  5.084  .  4.981 5.063 5.125 5.059 
Japan  5.308 5.548 5.282 4.853  .  5.241 
South-Korea  5.853 4.326 4.450 4.413  .  4.765 
Luxembourg  .  . 4.174 . 4.681  4.467 
Mexico  5.019 5.131 5.869 4.888  .  5.209 
Netherlands  4.913  .  4.821 5.370 5.237 5.105 
New  Zealand  . 5.653 . 5.541 . 5.604 
Norway  4.984 5.731  .  5.926 5.329 5.474 
Poland  3.289 4.289 4.911 4.219 5.681 4.407 
Portugal  6.691 .  .  . 6.017  6.310 
Slovakia 4.691  5.428  .  .  5.868  5.309 
Slovenia  5.256 6.516 6.947 6.312 7.349 6.537 
Spain  5.956 5.437 5.937 5.347 6.038 5.817 
Sweden  4.535 5.080  .  4.913 6.186 5.207 
Switzerland  . 6.159 . 7.367  6.322  6.622 
Turkey  6.419 5.928 6.903 6.028 6.545 6.515 
UK  4.551 5.937 5.394 5.585 5.562 5.360 
USA  4.263 5.565 5.282 4.815  .  4.942 
        
Total  4.892 5.584 5.758 5.557 5.950 5.516 
 
The true model determining the preferences for redistribution is unknown. To assure 
robustness of results a wide set of economic and socio-economic variables will be considered 
in the estimation procedure. The descriptive statistics of all individual-level dependent and 
explanatory variables are depicted in Table 4.
14 In the OECD sample 52% of respondents are 
female. Mean age is 44 years, 62% of the respondents are married (stat_married) and 74% 
                                                 
14 The coding of variables is detailed in Appendix II, Table B1.   16
have one or more children living in their household (child_present). For each set of dummy 
variables the respective reference category is marked with an “X” in column 7 of Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of dependent and explanatory micro variables, OECD sample 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
            
equal_income 162281 5.516  2.850  1 10   
equal_income_bin2 162281  0.196  0.397  0  1   
equal_income_bin9 162281  0.158  0.365  0  1   
            
female 200996  0.529  0.499  0  1   
age 196980  44.287  17.303  14  108   
age_sqr 196980  2260.769  1671.357  196  11664   
            
edu_no 134886  0.063  0.243  0  1  X 
edu_prime 134886  0.243  0.429 0  1   
edu_somesec 134886  0.233  0.423  0  1   
edu_sec 134886  0.300  0.458  0  1   
edu_uni 134886  0.161  0.367  0  1   
            
stat_married 199087  0.623 0.485  0 1  X 
stat_divorced 199087  0.068  0.252  0  1   
stat_widowed 199087 0.075  0.264  0  1   
stat_single 199087  0.233  0.423 0  1   
            
jobstat_full 195215  0.411 0.492 0 1  X 
jobstat_part 195215  0.076 0.265 0 1   
jobstat_self 195215  0.068 0.252 0 1   
jobstat_retired 195215 0.184  0.387  0  1   
jobstat_wife 195215  0.127 0.333  0 1   
jobstat_student 195215 0.060  0.237  0  1   
jobstat_unemp 195215 0.056  0.230  0  1   
jobstat_other 195215  0.019 0.135  0  1   
            
inc_quint1 167295  0.197  0.398 0  1   
inc_quint2 167295  0.284  0.451 0  1   
inc_quint3 167295  0.239  0.427 0  1  X 
inc_quint4 167295  0.176  0.381 0  1   
inc_quint5 167295  0.103  0.304 0  1   
            
religion_never 192830  0.4025255  0.490408 0  1  X 
religion_some 192830  0.2682881  0.4430696  0  1   
religion_reg 192830  0.3291863  0.469919  0 1   
            
class_upper 124261  0.189 0.392 0 1   
class_middle 124261  0.355 0.479  0  1   
class_working 124261 0.317  0.465  0  1  X 
class_lower 124261  0.139 0.346 0 1   
            
proud_bin1 187352  0.491 0.500 0 1   
trust 192212  0.350  0.477  0  1   
child_unselfish 196035 0.279  0.448  0  1   
poor_lazy 126313  0.276  0.447  0  1     17
poor_unfair 126313  0.402 0.490 0 1   
control_no 191298  0.046  0.210 0  1   
control_yes 191298  0.240 0.427 0 1   
success_work 92474 0.278 0.448 0 1   
success_luck 92474  0.098 0.298 0 1   
            
child_present 185577  0.744  0.436  0  1   
politic_left_bin2 163905  0.0763979  0.2656345 0  1  
politic_right_bin9 163905  0.0818096  0.2740752  0  1  
 
To control for macro-conditions the log of per-capita GDP (ln_pcgdp_wdi) and a 
number of other macro variables are included in the estimations. Further macro variables are 
the unemployment rate (unemp_wdi), the growth rate of GDP (gdp_growth_wdi), the relation 
of imports and exports to GDP (trade_wdi), the stock of foreign direct investments in million 
U.S. dollars (fdi_wdi), the Gini of equivalent household gross incomes (gini_gross), the gross-
gini ten years ago (gini_gross_lag10) and social expenditures as a fraction of GDP ten years 
ago (socexp_gdp_lag10). Summary statistics are presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Summary statistics of macro controls, OECD sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
ln_pcgdp_wdi 200060  9.977  0.466  8.720  11.200 
unemp_wdi 168259 7.434  3.737  0.600  22.700 
gdp_growth_wdi 198154  1.901  3.941  -14.574  10.653 
trade_wdi 199052  76.710 43.873  16.864  326.764 
fdi_wdi (Mio$)  188301  -6876.2  26346.6  -113165.0  68497.2 
gini_gross 185365  42.183 6.161  25.757  59.423 
gini_gross_lag10 182439  41.199  6.288  25.381  55.736 
socexp_gdp_lag10 104669  16.758  7.565  0.000  31.588 
Note: Data from OECD (2008), SWIID (2009) and WDI (2011) 
 
 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 
The preference for redistribution is measured with an item from a survey 
questionnaire. Since the dependent variable is a ten-point Likert-scaled variable, an ordinal 
logit model will be employed. No exogenous source of variation can be identified, so that 
estimates show statistical associations rather than causality. A causal effect of most analyzed 
determinants has been shown under experimental conditions as discussed in section 2. In the 
present study, the individual and joint statistical effect of respective determinants should be 
corroborated, using different and bigger data samples as has been the case so far. 
In a first step, a set of six models, stepwise including more control variables, is 
estimated. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) empirically show that culture has an important effect 
on preferences for redistribution. To account for unobserved cultural determinants, country   18
fixed effects are included in all regressions. In addition, time induced variation is controlled 
for with the inclusion of year fixed effects. The basic model is shown in equation (1). 
(1)       ict t c ict ict T C X R           '  
The preference for redistribution  ict R of individual i in country c at time t is explained by a set 
of economic and socioeconomic control variables ict X  and country and time fixed effects C 
and T. In addition to country fixed effects, robust standard errors correcting for clustering at 
the country level are included (Moulton 1990). This correction augments standard errors so 
that the p-values for the estimates can be considered conservative.      
In the first model (M1)  ict X  only consists of respondent’s sex, age and age squared. 
The second model (M2) includes information on educational achievements. Model 3 (M3) 
adds information on gross household income. In model four (M4) the respondents labour 
market status and marriage status are included. Since information on educational achievement 
is missing for a large number of cases, education is excluded in the specification of M4. The 
next model, M5 again includes education in addition to labour market- and marriage status. 
Model M6 finally adds dummies for the frequency of attendance to religious services. These 
six models together make up the basic configuration. It includes all variables that were 
hypothesised to influence narrowly defined material self-interest.  
In the next step the basic configuration is augmented with the focus variables, one at a 
time. Accordingly, model M1 to M6 will be rerun, estimating in turn the social rivalry effect, 
the social identity hypothesis, the influence of altruism, the effect of beliefs about the fairness 
of the distribution system, of beliefs about the moral worth of the poor and about the degree 
of self-control in life. Finally, all hypotheses will be tested jointly. To this end, model M1, 
M4 and M6 will each be estimated including all focus variables and subsets thereof. 
To check for robustness, the three just outlines estimation steps will be repeated 
including additional micro- and macro controls. Additional micro controls are political 
orientation and the information whether children are present in the household. Respective 
macro controls are the log of per-capita GDP, the unemployment rate, the growth rate, the 
stock of foreign direct investment, the fraction of trade to GDP, the Gini of gross household 
incomes, the Gini of gross incomes ten years ago and social expenditure as a fraction of GDP 
ten years ago. This comprises the analysis of the OECD sample which constitutes the main 
contribution of this paper. The analysis will then be replicated on the sample of available non-
OECD countries. 
A note on the use of language: results are derived using ordered logit models. These 
results are correctly interpreted in a probabilistic manner. Also, no exogenous variation is   19
present that would allow a causal interpretation of results. Still the verbal discussion of results 
will not always correctly express this interpretation, but instead describe the effect of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable. When done so, it is strictly for stylistic reasons. 
Readers should always be aware that results present statistical, probabilistic associations.  
 
5. Results for the OECD sample 
 
In this section the results for the OECD sample are presented. The estimations for the 
six models in the basic configuration are shown in Table 6. These results will be used to 
consider the hypotheses H1 to H5 which are based on the assumption of agents motivated by 
narrowly defined self-interest. 
In line with hypothesis H1, respondents with higher (lower) incomes have a lower 
(higher) probability to support redistribution and vice versa. Educational achievements also 
have the expected effects as formulated in H2. Higher educational achievements significantly 
reduce the probability of strong preferences for redistribution. Regarding hypothesis H3 on 
Table 6. Basic: Ordered logit estimations of Model M1 – M6 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
e q u a l _ i n c o m e         





  (-0.94)  (-0.33) (2.44) (5.17) (4.35) (4.28) 
age_sqr 0.000













  (8.54) (5.56) (5.13) (6.60) (5.70) (6.34) 





   (-4.76)  (-3.68)  (-4.06)  (-3.31) 





   (-6.33)  (-4.37)  (-4.80)  (-4.44) 





   (-6.51)  (-4.23)  (-4.85)  (-4.57) 





   (-7.56)  (-4.61)  (-4.99)  (-4.76) 





      (8.90) (5.69) (7.23) (6.97) 





      (6.16) (6.43) (6.08) (5.82) 





      (-7.24) (-7.19) (-6.61) (-6.46) 





      (-8.03) (-9.27) (-7.89) (-7.76) 




      (-2.28)  (-2.49)  (-2.56) 




      (-2.55)  (-1.84)  (-2.09) 
stat_widowed      -0.032  -0.045  -0.045 
      (-0.84)  (-1.08)  (-1.10) 
jobstat_part      0.059
* 0.032 0.028 
      (2.06)  (1.26)  (1.17) 




      (-4.62)  (-4.85)  (-4.85)   20
jobstat_retired      0.104
* 0.051
+ 0.049 
      (2.46)  (1.66)  (1.53) 
jobstat_wife     0.042  -0.060  -0.057 
      (1.10)  (-1.45)  (-1.40) 
jobstat_student      -0.017  -0.018  -0.012 
      (-0.49)  (-0.46)  (-0.30) 




      (3.53)  (2.99)  (2.70) 
jobstat_other     0.144
* 0.047 0.038 
      (2.29)  (0.95)  (0.73) 
religion_some        -0.085
*** 
        ( - 4 . 2 9 )  
religion_reg        -0.050
+ 
        ( - 1 . 8 4 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  162002 119838 101444 133313  97514  94779 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: constants for each cut-off not reported. 
 
self-employment, it is noted that less risk adverse individuals demand less social insurance 
against income shocks. If the self-employed are less risk averse, and their lower risk aversion 
is not overcompensated by higher income volatility, self-employment should reduce the 
probability to opt for high levels of redistribution. This is confirmed by the estimation results 
for  jobstat_self. In H4 it is hypothesised that marriage might be a substitute for social 
insurance provided by redistributive schemes. Results indicate at significance levels of 5% 
that marriage reduces the likelihood of respondents to support redistribution. Membership in a 
religious community could also function as a substitute for social insurance. As formulated in 
hypothesis H5, more religious individuals should demand less redistribution. This is in part 
confirmed by the results. Individuals who attend religious services have lower probabilities to 
support redistribution. However, while the coefficient for some attendance is highly 
significant, the coefficient for regular attendance is only weakly significant.  
Next, we will turn our attention to the focus variables. The basic configuration is 
augmented with the focus variables, one at a time, and model M1-M6 are re-estimated. The 
coefficients obtained for the respective focus variable and the sample size for each estimation 
are presented in Table 7 to 9. As can be seen from Table 7 estimation results indicate the 
presence of the social rivalry effect (H6). After controlling for income, an individual’s social 
class still has significant explanatory power. Being member of a higher class significantly 
reduces the probability of having strong preferences for redistribution. The insignificant 
coefficients for membership in the lowest class in model M3, M5 and M6 are in line with the 
social rivalry effect, if one assumes that the status differential between the lower class and the 
working class is sufficiently small compared to the status differentials between the working   
class and middle and higher class, respectively. However, there are some caveats to this   21
interpretation of social class. While income is controlled for, social class is certainly highly 
correlated with a large number of other, unobserved individual characteristics of material 
wealth. The effect of social class might rather measure the effect of pecuniary self-interest 
associated with different forms of unobserved wealth than considerations of social status. 
Corneo (2001) and Corneo and Grüner (2002), use international occupational prestige scores 
to capture individuals’ social position and derive the social rivalry effect. This approach can 
not be replicated here, since detailed information about respondents’ occupation is not 
available.  
Table 7 also depicts the coefficients for nationalism. As formulated in hypothesis H7 
on social identity, individuals with a stronger feeling toward their nation should have weaker 
preferences for redistribution. As can be seen from the results, being very proud of your 
nation in fact significantly reduces the probability of strong redistributive preferences. 
Table 7. Focus Variables: social rivalry effect and social identity 




















** 0.080  0.103 
  (4.29) (1.83) (1.34) (3.14) (1.06) (1.32) 








  (-4.26) (-4.51) (-4.73) (-5.60) (-4.69) (-4.51) 
N  150880  110768 94197 124600 90405  88460 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The next table (Table 8) depicts the coefficients for the variables associated with the 
fairness of the allocation system, moral worthiness of the poor and individual control and 
responsibility. First note that there are relatively few observations for the variable that 
measures the belief in the relation between hard work and success, i.e. the fairness of the 
distributive system (success_work, success_work). As can be seen from the estimated 
coefficients, individuals who think that hard work brings success, i.e. the system is fair 
(success_work), have a lower probability to demand redistribution. This is stated in 
hypothesis H8a. In contrast, the belief that the system is unfair, i.e. success is determined by 
luck (success_luck), does not increase the probability of strong preferences for redistribution. 
Accordingly, hypothesis H8b is not supported.      22
Table 8. Focus Variables: just world beliefs, moral worth and self-control 








  (-4.82) (-2.05) (-2.06) (-4.65) (-1.85) (-1.94) 
success_luck 0.095  0.081  0.005 0.016 0.023 0.019 
  (1.15) (0.72) (0.05) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) 
















  (10.03) (10.13) (10.28)  (9.63)  (10.23) (10.32) 
















  (-4.75) (-3.91) (-3.13) (-4.03) (-3.17) (-3.44) 
N  154332  113238 95686 127891 92905  91834 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
An associated variable considers the moral worth of the poor. Are people poor because 
they where lazy or does their poverty result from an unfair society? As can be seen in Table 8, 
the belief that poverty results from laziness (poor_lazy) has a strongly significant, negative 
effect on the support for redistribution. In contrast to the result for the belief in a just 
allocation system (success_luck), the belief that poverty results from an unfair society 
(poor_unfair), increases the probability for strong preferences for redistribution. Accordingly, 
hypothesis H9a and H9b are both supported by the data.  
The perceived level of individual autonomy and control is also considered as an 
important explanatory determinant for the support of redistribution. The results shown in 
Table 8 support this point of view. The belief that one has “free choice and control” over ones 
life, decreases the support for redistribution. In contrast, the feeling that own actions can not 
change outcomes, has a significant positive effect on the probability for strong preferences for 
redistribution. Hypotheses H10a and H10b are both corroborated. Fong (2001) arrives at 
similar conclusions and states “that the belief about the prevalence of poverty is usually 
significant whether or not we control for self- and exogenous-determination beliefs, but it is 
not as robust to sample size and specification changes as the self and exogenous-
determination beliefs” (Fong 2001, p. 242). Following hypothesis H11, higher levels of 
altruism should be associated with stronger support for redistribution. The results for the 
respective variable (child_unselfish) presented in Table 9, do not allow a final conclusion. All 
estimated coefficients are positive. However, for the two models with most observations (not 
controlling for education) results are insignificant. The appropriate answer to H11 remains 
ambiguous.   23
Table 9. Focus Variables: altruism 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 





  (0.65) (2.46) (2.91) (1.18) (3.16) (3.10) 
N  157353  116334 98573 129380 94650  92633 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Do the estimation results considered in H1-H5 and discussed earlier, change if focus 
variables are included? Table 10 provides a quick overview. The symbol indicates the sign of 
a significant coefficient; a zero indicates an insignificant estimate. In column six the first 
symbol refers to some attendance of religious services, the second one to regular attendance. 
As can be seen, the results for income, education and self-employment are robust to the 
inclusion of any of the focus variables. Being married does not show a statistical significant 
effect on preferences for redistribution if social identity or moral worth of the poor is taken 
into account. The effect for some religious activity is also not robust to the inclusion of beliefs 
about moral worth (poor_lazy and poor_unfair).  
Table 10. Result Overview (H1-H5) 
 income  education  self-employed  married  religious 
class_ - - - -  -/- 
proud_bin1  - - - 0  -/0 
hard_work  - - - -  -/0 
poor_ - - - 0  0/0 
control - - - -  -/0 
child_unselfish  - - - -  -/0 
 
We now turn to the central part of the analysis. How do the focus variables perform in 
explaining the preferences for redistribution, if included jointly in the estimation equation? 
The biggest obstacle to this exercise is data availability: simultaneously including all focus 
variables and socio-economic controls dramatically reduces sample size. To see whether the 
estimated effects are driven by sample attrition, the three models, M1, M4 and M6 are used to 
estimate the cumulated effects of all focus variables. These configurations with six 
specifications each will be referred to as cumulated M1, cumulated M4 and cumulated M6. 
Model M1 only includes respondents’ gender and age; M4 adds marriage status, job-status 
and income. Model M6 includes all socioeconomic controls used in the basic configuration. 
Since hard_work (i.e. success_luck, success_work), the variable measuring the belief in the 
fairness of the allocation mechanism, is missing for a considerable number of observations, 
M1, M4 and M6 with cumulated focus variables will be estimated with and without this 
variable. Since the sample size is bigger, we only present those results without hard_work. 
For M1 and M4 only the estimates of the focus variables will be depicted (Table 11 and 12), 
for M6 all estimated coefficients will be shown (Table 13). In the cumulated configurations, 
at first the dummies for social class are included. Then stepwise the variables for nationalism   24
(proud_bin1), individual autonomy and control (control_), moral worth of the poor (poor_) 
and altruism (child_unselfish) are included. In addition to all these focus variables, a measure 
of individual trust is added in model (6). Trust might capture unobserved ethnical 
heterogeneity of the respondents social environment or her degree of reciprocity and the like 
and is only included as a robustness check.  
As can be seen from inspection of Table 11 and Table 12, the estimates obtained for 
the focus variables are qualitatively very similar for cumulated M1 and M4. The social rivalry 
effect is present in all estimations; the social identity hypothesis is also accepted in Table 11 
and 12. The feeling of autonomy and control decreases the support for redistribution, the lack 
thereof increases support. If the poor are viewed as morally unworthy and responsible for 
their poverty due to laziness, the probability to have strong preferences for redistribution 
decreases. If on the other hand, an unfair society is seen as the reason for poverty, stronger 
support for redistribution becomes more likely. Finally, the degree of altruism as measured by 
(the admittedly imperfect measure) child-unselfish does not have an effect on the preferences 
for redistribution. The effect of altruism as formulated in hypothesis H11 was ambivalent 
already in the last step. Given the present negative results, hypothesis H11 has to be rejected. 
However, I do not want to conclude that altruism has no effect on preferences for 
redistribution, but rather posit that the measure used is not a good proxy for individual 
altruism.   
Table 11. Ordered Logit estimation: cumulate M1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























  (4.29) (4.52) (4.25) (3.39) (3.31) (3.30) 






    (-3.36) (-2.83) (-2.24) (-2.17) (-2.19) 





      (4.47) (4.15) (4.18) (4.03) 





      (-3.39) (-3.92) (-3.83) (-3.80) 




      (-3.14)  (-3.12)  (-3.23) 




      (9.52)  (9.64)  (9.42) 
child_unselfish       0.013  0.017 
       (0.53)  (0.73) 
trust        -0.003 
        ( - 0 . 1 0 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  103440  96517 92147 58456 57602 55346 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   25
Table 12. Ordered Logit estimation: cumulate M4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























  (3.14) (3.34) (3.11) (2.19) (2.09) (2.11) 






    (-4.25) (-3.65) (-2.75) (-2.70) (-2.79) 





      (4.23) (3.62) (3.61) (3.57) 





      (-3.43) (-3.87) (-3.78) (-3.79) 




      (-2.37)  (-2.36)  (-2.51) 




      (7.75)  (7.86)  (7.78) 
child_unselfish       0.015  0.018 
       (0.59)  (0.71) 
trust        0.004 
        ( 0 . 1 1 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  86923 81302 78563 48481 47653 45812 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The estimates for cumulate model M6 are shown in Table 13. Note that the sample 
size is comparatively small. In specification (6) there are only 21,160 observations left.
15 It is 
obvious that income and education still have the hypothesized effect. Being self-employed has 
a significantly negative effect (both in M6 and in M4). Being married, however, does not 
result in robust effects. While estimates in M6 are mostly insignificant, unreported estimates 
for being married (stat_married) in M4 even change their sign. I conclude that marriage is not 
a robust determinant for the preferences for redistribution. 
 
Table 13. Ordered Logit estimation: cumulate M6 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




***  0.007 0.007 0.006 




***  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 












+ -0.094 -0.088 -0.066 
















  (-2.90) (-2.65) (-2.58) (-2.52) (-2.54) (-2.41) 
                                                 
15 There are still 22 countries in the sample of specification 6: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 












* -0.038 -0.035 -0.017 
  (-2.56) (-1.93) (-2.37) (-0.99) (-0.92) (-0.39) 
stat_divorced -0.071
+  -0.062  -0.065 0.003 0.008 0.029 
  (-1.85) (-1.53) (-1.61) (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.43) 
stat_widowed  -0.033 -0.018 -0.036 0.006  0.009  0.025 
  (-0.61) (-0.35) (-0.73) (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.40) 
jobstat_part 0.063 0.075
+ 0.075
+ -0.042 -0.040 -0.051 
















  (2.23) (2.24) (2.43) (1.93) (1.94) (1.80) 




  (-0.76) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.95) 
jobstat_student 0.072  0.089
* 0.092
* 0.029 0.029 0.034 
  (1.46) (2.14) (2.15) (0.52) (0.52) (0.63) 
jobstat_unemp 0.075
+ 0.062 0.062 0.067 0.069 0.074 
  (1.70) (1.52) (1.53) (1.08) (1.11) (1.19) 
jobstat_other -0.065 -0.072 -0.058 -0.030 -0.035 -0.009 












* 0.052 0.052 0.055 




*** -0.078  -0.078  -0.087
+ 
















  (-4.95) (-5.02) (-4.58) (-1.95) (-1.87) (-1.68) 
religion_reg -0.063
* -0.054
+ -0.052 -0.009 -0.006 -0.000 
















  (-5.35) (-5.55) (-5.45) (-5.23) (-5.33) (-5.40) 
class_lower 0.103 0.101 0.083 0.014 0.011 0.011 
  (1.32) (1.28) (1.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
proud_bin1   -0.121
** -0.119
* -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 
    (-2.84) (-2.52) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.67) 





      (4.33) (2.22) (2.27) (2.30) 





      (-2.77) (-2.49) (-2.52) (-2.61) 
poor_lazy      -0.062  -0.061  -0.065 
      (-1.26)  (-1.25)  (-1.37) 




      (8.32)  (8.47)  (8.84) 
child_unselfish       0.092
** 0.095
** 
       (2.58)  (2.97) 
trust        0.041 
        ( 1 . 2 8 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  54807 51349 50143 21688 21672 21160 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Comparing the resulting estimates from cumulative M6 with those of cumulative M1 
and M4, the social rivalry effect remains significant and important. Nationalism (proud_bin1),   27
which is used to test the hypothesis on social identity (H7), still has a negative coefficient. 
However, results are insignificant for specification (4), (5) and (6). The perception of 
individual control and autonomy in life increases, the absence of this perception decreases the 
probability for strong preferences for redistribution. The belief that society is unfair has a 
significant positive effect on the support for redistribution. In contrast, the belief that poverty 
is caused by laziness of the poor does not have a significant effect on redistributive 
preferences. While the influence of altruism, as formulated in hypothesis H11 was already 
rejected, estimations now show a significant positive effect of altruism on the support of 
redistribution. These results clearly differ from those obtained for the cumulated models M1 
and M4. Now, is this difference due to sample attrition or do the additional control variables 
drive these results? In unreported regressions I add educational achievements to the 
cumulated M1 specifications and obtain qualitatively similar results as those from M6 
cumulated.
16 However, if cumulated M1 is estimated without using the information of 
educational achievements but restricting the sample to only include those observations with 
valid information on education, results for altruism (child_unselfish) are likewise significant. 
The same is true if the sample is restricted to only include those cases used in specification 6 
of M6 cumulated. From this I derive that the differences between cumulated M1 and M4 on 
the one hand, and cumulated M6 on the other, derive mainly from sample attrition. Still, only 
those results will be considered robust which show a significant effect in all estimations of 
cumulated M1, M4 and M6. Altruism, as measured here, will accordingly not be considered a 
robust determinant for preferences of redistribution. 
As already mentioned, the hard-work variable, measuring the belief in the fairness of 
the distribution system, has been excluded from the estimations of cumulated M1, M4 and M6 
as presented in Table 11, 12 and 13. Including the hard-work variable (success_luck, 
success_work) does not change the conclusions on hypothesis H1-H7 and H9-H11, but 
drastically reduces the number of observations. What about the variable itself and the 
associated hypotheses H8a and H8b? Table 14 reports the estimated coefficients for the two 
hard-work dummies. It can be seen that the belief that success is only determined by luck 
never has a statistical significant effect. In contrast, believing that hard work results in 
success, i.e. that the distribution system is fair, significantly reduces the probability for strong 
support for redistribution in the estimation of cumulated M1 and M4. 
                                                 
16 Regression results are available from the author upon request.   28
Table 14. Estimates for hard-work from Cumulated M1 M4 M6 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







  (-3.90) (-3.60) (-3.65) (-2.93) (-2.89) (-2.93) 
M1 success_luck  0.055  0.060 0.062 0.039 0.057 0.054 
  (0.62) (0.71) (0.77) (0.59) (0.91) (0.86) 
N  76287 71873 69108 46704 45880 44018 







  (-3.87) (-3.49) (-3.60) (-2.82) (-2.78) (-2.80) 
M4 success_luck  0.019  0.029 0.025 0.007 0.025 0.024 
  (0.21) (0.33) (0.29) (0.09) (0.36) (0.34) 
N  64225 60369 58870 38814 38008 36452 
M6 success_work  -0.150
+ -0.113 -0.110 -0.050 -0.047 -0.039 
  (-1.67) (-1.39) (-1.48) (-0.52) (-0.49) (-0.41) 
M6 success_luck  -0.001  0.024 0.007 0.044 0.046 0.050 
  (-0.01) (0.20) (0.06) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) 
N  34896 32277 31327 12520 12520 12251 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
If sample size is reduced and/or additional controls included, these results are no longer 
statistically significant. In contrast, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) find that the belief that 
success is determined by luck has a significant positive effect on preferences for 
redistribution. This finding most likely results from the use of a different dependent variable 
(responsibility) and the inclusion of hard-work as a numeric variable. 
The gender effect, hypothesized in H12, is strongly significantly and robustly present 
in all estimations based on the OECD sample. Accordingly, women are found to have a 
higher probability of strong preferences for redistribution than men.  
  
5.2 Robustness checks for the OECD sample 
 
To further assure robustness of results, the three analytical steps outlined above 
(estimation of basic configuration, individual estimation of each focus variable, estimation of 
cumulated models), have been repeated without controlling for time effects, with the inclusion 
of some additional micro and macro controls and the use of standard OLS estimation 
techniques.
17 The results based on OLS are qualitatively similar. To get a feeling for the size 
of respective effects, the models of cumulated M6 have been re-estimated using OLS. For 
some coefficients the level of significance is slightly higher or lower. However, no 
modification of the conclusions derived from the ordered logit results is necessary. Results for 
the OLS estimations are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix I. The same holds true for the 
ordered logit estimations without year fixed effects. Results remain qualitatively similar. Only 
                                                 
17 Neither the estimates without year fixed effects, nor most OLS estimates, nor the regressions with additional 
controls will be reported and can be obtained from the author upon request.   29
for the estimation of the cumulated models, the variable indicating the belief that poverty 
results from laziness (poor_lazy) does not produce any significant results. 
Also the inclusion of additional control variables in the ordered logit estimations does 
not alter results. We briefly discuss the estimated coefficients for the additional controls.  A 
dummy that indicates the presence of children in the household (child_present) has a mostly 
negative but insignificant coefficient. In contrast, the political attitude of the respondent has a 
statistically significant and robust effect (Alesina and Giuliano 2009). People who position 
themselves on the left (right) of the political spectrum have a significantly higher (lower) 
probability for strong preferences for redistribution than those in the middle. In the political 
science literature it is sometimes stated that political attitudes are formed prior to preferences 
over actual policies (Jaeger 2008). However, this timing of preference formation is hard to 
prove. Also the explanatory value of political attitudes is not obvious. For this reasons, 
political attitudes are not included in the main analysis.
18 The inclusion of macro controls also 
leave results qualitatively unchanged. At first, only the log of per capita GDP is included. 
While some estimated coefficients for this macro variable are significant, the sign changes 
and depends on the specification. The log of per capita GDP is then supplemented with 
additional macro controls. These are the ratio of trade to GDP and the stock of foreign net 
investments, the growth rate of GDP and the unemployment rate, social expenditure over 
GDP, social expenditure over GDP ten years ago, the Gini coefficient of gross household 
incomes and ten year lags thereof. All these macro variables do not exhibit a systematic 
statistical relation with preferences for redistribution and do not change the conclusion with 
respect to hypothesis H1-H12. 
In sum, for the OECD we find that higher income and education levels reduce the 
support for redistribution (H1 and H2 corroborated). Being self-employed also reduced the 
probability for strong redistributive preferences (H3 corroborated). Being married and more 
actively involved in religious activities do not result in a robust effect on preferences for 
redistribution (H4 and H5 not corroborated). The social rivalry effect is found to be an 
important determinant for redistributive preferences (H6 corroborated). Social identity in the 
form of national pride is shown to have a statistical effect on preferences for redistribution 
over a large group of specifications. However, results are not fully robust so that hypothesis 
H7 is not supported. Regarding the fairness of the distribution system the belief that success is 
a matter of luck rather than hard work does not have any effect on support for redistribution 
(H8b not corroborated). The contrary believe that hard work brings success shows a statistical 
                                                 
18 Individual satisfaction with own financial situation is another variable that has a strong statistical relation with 
redistributive preferences, but is not included due to questionable explanatory meaning.   30
association in most, but not all specifications. Accordingly, hypothesis H8a can not be 
substantiated. The idea that poverty results from laziness does not have a robust association 
with support for redistribution (H9a not corroborated). On the contrary, people who think that 
poverty is the results of an unfair society have a systematically higher probability for strong 
preferences for redistribution (H9b corroborated). The feeling of autonomy and control over 
ones life decreases support for redistribution (H10a corroborated). The lack of autonomy and 
control does have a positive effect on redistributive preferences. However, since results are 
not robust over all specifications hypothesis H10b is not corroborated. A significant positive 
effect of altruism is found for some, but nor for all specifications, so that hypothesis H11 is 
not supported. Finally, respondent’s sex is found to be a highly robust predictor for the 
support of redistribution. In line with hypothesis H12, women show significant stronger 
preferences for redistribution than men in all performed estimations.
19  
 
6. Results for non-OECD countries 
 
Exploiting the merits of the WVS data, the analysis is now performed with the large 
sample of non-OECD countries. For these countries the mean of the dependent variable 
equal-income by country and wave is presented in Table 15. There are 196,712 valid 
observations in 66 countries. The sample is quite heterogeneous. Following World Bank 
categories, about ten percent of the observations come from high income countries, about 
82% from middle income countries and about eight percent from low income countries. Per 
capita GDP in constant international 2005 Dollar is as low as 247$ for Zimbabwe and up to 
26,000$ for Northern Cyprus and Northern Ireland. The mean per capita GDP over all 
available country-year observations is 6,617$ as compared to 23,793$ for the OECD sample. 
The average preferences for redistribution is lower in these non-OECD countries as compared 
to the OECD countries, as can be seen at the end of Table 15. Algeria has the lowest average 
preference for redistribution in the sample, Northern Cyprus the highest. 
Table 15. Mean of equal-income by country and wave 
country \ wave  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
        
Albania .  6.115  5.041  .  6.094  5.796 
Algeria  .  . 2.911 .  . 2.911 
Andorra . . .  4.856  .  4.856 
Argentina  3.995 5.044 6.101 5.671  .  5.257 
Armenia  . 4.604 .  . 4.692  4.642 
                                                 
19 Basically all empirical studies find the positive association of female gender on preferences for redistribution. 
These findings are in line with those on gender effects in altruism (Andreoni and Versterlund 2001) and 
competition (Gneezy et al. 2009).   31
Azerbaijan  . 5.103 .  . 6.310  5.636 
Bangladesh  . 3.893  3.439 .  . 3.669 
Belarus  3.652 4.374 5.734  .  5.367 4.753 
Bosnia .  5.504  4.897  .  6.678  5.765 
Brazil  5.140  5.289 . 5.325 . 5.242 
Bulgaria  4.282 5.604 4.637 5.326 3.465 4.567 
Burkina  Faso  . . .  3.922  .  3.922 
China  3.127 5.958 4.737 5.227  .  4.938 
Colombia  . 4.798 . 5.500 . 5.150 
Croatia .  5.995  6.572  .  6.803  6.476 
Cyprus  . . .  5.728  6.043  5.877 
Dominican  Rep.  . 3.288 .  .  . 3.288 
Egypt .  .  2.768  4.239  .  3.505 
El  Salvador  . 4.173 .  .  . 4.173 
Ethiopia . . .  4.386  .  4.386 
Georgia  . 3.401 . 4.126  3.313  3.586 
Ghana  . . .  3.237  .  3.237 
Guatemala  . . .  3.928  .  3.928 
Hong  Kong  . . .  6.222  .  6.222 
India  5.012 7.345 6.822 6.210  .  6.230 
Indonesia .  .  3.821  3.632  .  3.697 
Iran .  .  5.336  6.833  .  6.201 
Iraq  .  . 5.575 .  . 5.575 
Jordan .  .  3.736  4.031  .  3.882 
Kosovo . . . .  6.564  6.564 
Kyrgyz  Republic  .  . 5.557 .  . 5.557 
Latvia 3.696  4.532  .  .  4.406  4.285 
Lithuania  3.665 5.766 5.857  .  5.622 5.268 
Macedonia .  5.888  5.687 .  . 5.784 
Malaysia . . .  4.337  .  4.337 
Mali  . . .  3.465  .  3.465 
Malta 3.159  .  .  .  4.279  4.041 
Moldova . . . .  5.962  5.962 
Montenegro  . . . .  5.249  5.249 
Morocco . .  3.254  5.652  .  4.084 
Nigeria  3.341 4.223 4.751  .  .  4.262 
Northern  Cyprus  . . . .  6.919  6.919 
Northern  Ireland  4.128 . 5.354 . 5.956  5.310 
Pakistan  . 3.738  7.174 .  . 6.027 
Peru .  4.371  3.484  3.521  .  3.746 
Philippines  . 5.000  4.443 .  . 4.722 
Puerto  Rico  . 4.773  3.514 .  . 4.287 
Moldova .  3.970  4.296  5.198  .  4.504 
Romania  4.540 4.716 7.313 6.337 7.436 6.133 
Russia  4.006 4.536 3.918 4.600 4.568 4.299 
Rwanda . . .  5.029  .  5.029 
Saudi  Arabia .  . 4.283 .  . 4.283 
Serbia  .  5.783 5.497 4.903 6.437 5.672 
Singapore  .  . 4.043 .  . 4.043 
South  Africa 5.267 5.942 5.580 5.334  .  5.536 
Taiwan  . 4.942 . 4.150 . 4.455 
Thailand . . .  3.933  .  3.933 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  . . .  3.817  .  3.817 
Uganda  .  . 3.807 .  . 3.807 
Ukraine  .  4.329 3.604 4.116 3.339 3.921   32
Tanzania  .  . 6.032 .  . 6.032 
Uruguay  . 5.850 . 5.647 . 5.750 
Venezuela  . 5.446  5.421 .  . 5.433 
Vietnam . .  4.670  5.012  .  4.878 
Zambia . . .  4.772  .  4.772 
Zimbabwe  .  . 4.161 .  . 4.161 
        
Total  4.348 4.986 4.776 4.860 5.428 4.904 
OECD-Total  4.892 5.584 5.758 5.557 5.950 5.516 
 
The descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables for this sample is 
relegated to the Appendix I, Table A3. Table 16 depicts the distribution of the preferences for 
redistribution (equal-income) for the non-OECD sample and for the OECD sample to allow 
comparison. While in the OECD only 10% of respondents demand higher income differences 
as incentives, in the non-OECD sample 20% of respondents do so. Apparently, there is a 
perception that incentive costs of redistribution are high in these countries. One reason might 
be that in less developed economies incentives are perceived as more important due to an 
economy wide inefficient use of labour (e.g. over-employment in the public sector in 
resource-abundant countries). 
Table 16. Distribution of equal-income in the non-OECD and OECD Sample 
 NON-OECD  Sample OECD  Sample 
equal_income  Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
        
incentives to individual efforts (1)  38,824  19.74  19.74  16,237  10.01  10.01 
2  15,899 8.08  27.82  9,460  5.83 15.83 
3  24,979 12.7  40.52  22,495 13.86  29.7 
4  18,864 9.59  50.11  18,539 11.42 41.12 
5  14,974 7.61  57.72  14,455  8.91 50.03 
6  23,618  12.01 69.73  21,394 13.18 63.21 
7  11,480 5.84  75.56  12,942  7.98 71.19 
8  12,114  6.16  81.72 14,950 9.21 80.4 
9 9,879  5.02  86.74  10,563  6.51  86.91 
 incomes more equal (10)  26,081  13.26  100  21,246  13.09  100 
Total  196,712 100    162,281  100   
 
Employing the same econometric approach as used above, we directly turn to the 
estimation results for the non-OECD sample. A first surprise is that sample attrition, i.e. 
sample size reduction due to the inclusion of more explanatory variables, is less of a problem 
in the present sample as compare to the OECD sample.
20 The estimation results for the basic 
configuration are shown in Table 17. Income (H1) and education (H2) have the expected 
significant effect. However, self-employment (H3), marriage (H4) and religion (H5) do not 
                                                 
20 At first sight, less item non-response might be interpreted as indication of better data quality. However, higher 
item response could also result from forged data not obtained in the field, but invented by the interviewer. On 
issues of survey data quality in developing countries see Judge and Schechter (2009).   33
show any statistical relation to preferences for redistribution. Instead, being unemployed or 
retired has a significant positive effect on preferences for redistribution. 
Table 17. Basic: Ordered logit estimations of Model M1 – M6 
  M1  M 2  M 3  M 4  M 5  M 6 




* -0.001  0.002  0.001 




* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 








  (5.13) (3.00) (3.05) (2.18) (2.00) (1.92) 





   (-3.07)  (-2.93)  (-3.01)  (-2.34) 





   (-6.91)  (-7.09)  (-7.11)  (-6.79) 





   (-6.38)  (-6.76)  (-6.77)  (-7.54) 





   (-7.79)  (-8.17)  (-8.09)  (-8.31) 
inc_quint1     0.097  0.173
* 0.088 0.072 
      (1.53) (2.44) (1.38) (1.40) 





      (3.83) (4.93) (3.97) (4.28) 





      (-3.35) (-4.51) (-3.29) (-3.90) 





      (-5.27) (-6.13) (-5.06) (-4.82) 
stat_married     0.024  -0.001  0.006 
      (0.92)  (-0.04)  (0.27) 
stat_divorced      -0.013  -0.034  -0.018 
      (-0.34)  (-1.05)  (-0.60) 




      (2.83)  (2.04)  (2.10) 
jobstat_part      0.060  0.061
+ 0.060
+ 
      (1.51)  (1.67)  (1.83) 
jobstat_self      0.017  -0.048  -0.034 
      (0.53)  (-1.45)  (-1.05) 




      (3.80)  (3.83)  (3.95) 
jobstat_wife     0.122
*** 0.019  0.038 
      (4.02)  (0.63)  (1.38) 




      (2.20)  (2.46)  (2.25) 




      (5.60)  (4.03)  (3.94) 
jobstat_other     0.208
** 0.117 0.148
* 
      (2.84)  (1.59)  (2.16) 
religion_some        -0.027 
        ( - 1 . 0 6 )  
religion_reg        0.024 
        ( 0 . 8 9 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  196375 185164 165805 171618 161772 152181 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The importance of income, education, unemployment and retirement can also be 
observed in the estimations including each focus variable individually. The estimation results   34
for each focus variable individually, will now be discussed. As can be seen in Table 18 the 
social rivalry effect and the social identity effect are both supported by the data.  
Table 18. Focus Variables: social rivalry effect and social identity 




















* 0.040 0.044 
  (3.83) (2.05) (1.46) (2.43) (1.34) (1.49) 








  (-2.98) (-3.44) (-3.75) (-3.51) (-3.70) (-3.55) 
N  188226 177470 159257 164817 155342 145957 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As reported in Table 19, the perception of a fair allocation system does not result in a 
meaningful relation with preferences for redistribution. Respondents believing that hard work 
results in success (success_work) have weaker preferences for redistribution. However, 
respondents who think that success is a matter of luck (success_luck) also have significantly 
less support for redistribution. This relation is contrary to the hypothesized one and is difficult 
to make sense of.  The beliefs in the moral worth of the poor show the same effects as in the 
OECD sample. If poverty is thought to be the result of laziness (poor_lazy), support for 
redistribution decreases. If, on the other hand an unfair society is seen as the reason for 
poverty (poor_unfair), the probability for strong redistributive preferences is higher. 
Table 19. Focus Variables: just world beliefs, moral worth and self-control 
















  (-7.52) (-7.15) (-6.51) (-6.75) (-6.16) (-6.29) 
















  (2.79) (3.03) (3.05) (2.88) (3.06) (2.84) 
N  93619 84335 74767 80398 72235 67693 
control_no 0.155
+ 0.127 0.128 0.137
+ 0.126 0.098 








  (-9.35) (-8.84) (-8.61) (-8.76) (-8.44) (-8.33) 
N  189674 179751 161243 165991 157317 148660 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As is the case in OECD countries, individuals who feel autonomous and in control of their life 
(control_yes) have a lower probability for strong preferences for redistribution. However, the 
opposite is not true. Lacking the feeling of control and autonomy does not robustly increase 
the support for redistribution. Finally, altruism as captured by child-unselfish has the   35
hypothesized positive effect on preferences for redistribution (Table 20). 
 
Table 20. Focus Variables: altruism 








  (2.14) (2.70) (2.54) (2.15) (2.58) (2.39) 
N  192107 180927 161791 167697 157877 148321 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Turning to the cumulated models, the results for the estimation of cumulated M1 in 
Table 21 show a robust effect of the social rivalry effect. The social identity effect has some 
statistical backing but is not significant for all estimations. This however, might be driven by 
sample attrition, since with the inclusion of poor-lazy and poor-unfair about two third of the 
observations are lost. Control over life and autonomy have the expected effect, albeit the 
effect is weak for individuals lacking the feeling of control. Perceptions about the reasons of 
poverty (laziness and unfair society) and altruism have no effect whatsoever.  
Table 21. Ordered logit estimation cumulate M1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















































  (3.83) (3.35) (2.98) (4.16) (4.28) (4.03) 
proud_bin1   -0.105
** -0.085
* -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
    (-2.81) (-2.31) (-1.03) (-1.01) (-0.99) 




      (1.17) (2.34) (2.30) (2.21) 





      (-8.90) (-6.44) (-6.64) (-6.77) 
poor_lazy      -0.156  -0.166  -0.153 
      (-1.63)  (-1.62)  (-1.51) 
poor_unfair      0.061  0.049  0.065 
      (0.59)  (0.45)  (0.59) 
child_unselfish       0.023  0.015 
       (1.02)  (0.65) 
trust        0.128
*** 
        ( 4 . 3 6 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  141119 136492 132046  46650  45718  44227 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The estimation results for cumulated M6, with all socioeconomic controls from the 
basic configuration, by and large corroborate the findings from cumulated M1. The social   36
rivalry effect is important (class_upper-class_lower); the social identity effect has some 
support. Feelings of individual control (control_yes, control_no) significantly affect 
preferences for redistribution. The view that poverty results from an unfair society 
(poor_unfair) has no effect on support for redistribution. Neither has altruism 
(child_unselfish). The perception that poverty results from laziness (poor_lazy) however has a 
weakly significant, negative effect on the support for redistribution. Finally, income and 
education have the expected negative effects. The effect of unemployment is not robust, the 
positive and significant effect of retirement is. It is also noteworthy that the effect of gender is 
not robust in the sample of non-OECD countries. 
Table 22. Ordered logit estimation cumulate M6 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
e q u a l _ i n c o m e         
age  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001  0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.10) (-0.27) (-0.08) (0.16)  (0.01) (-0.02) 
age_sqr  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.32) (-0.10) (-0.20) (-0.39) (-0.25) (-0.32) 
female  0.022 0.019 0.013 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (1.37) (1.13) (0.80) (-0.06) (0.01) (0.00) 
edu_prime -0.071
+ -0.069
+ -0.045 -0.024 -0.031 -0.043 
























  (-7.78) (-8.15) (-8.30) (-6.56) (-6.40) (-6.41) 
stat_married  0.017 0.023 0.015 0.064 0.065 0.069 
  (0.68) (0.87) (0.58) (1.40) (1.37) (1.44) 
stat_divorced  -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 0.041  0.042  0.057 












+ -0.003 0.002 -0.016 
  (1.77) (1.88) (1.93) (-0.04) (0.02) (-0.24) 
















+ 0.024 0.028 0.025 




* 0.038 0.040 0.044 




***  0.047 0.042 0.046 
  (3.60) (3.72) (3.66) (0.95) (0.82) (0.91) 
jobstat_other 0.139
+ 0.134
+ 0.088 0.027 0.016 0.008 
  (1.74) (1.70) (1.37) (0.29) (0.17) (0.08) 




























  (-4.37) (-4.28) (-4.23) (-2.25) (-2.16) (-2.11)   37
religion_some  -0.026 -0.018 -0.012 0.023  0.021  0.023 
  (-1.08) (-0.75) (-0.50) (0.57)  (0.51)  (0.55) 
religion_reg  0.012 0.017 0.025 0.059 0.064 0.074
+ 
















  (-4.18) (-4.39) (-3.85) (-3.82) (-3.64) (-3.21) 
class_lower  0.044 0.032 0.017 0.071 0.074 0.072 
  (1.49) (1.05) (0.55) (1.51) (1.54) (1.40) 
proud_bin1   -0.111
** -0.089
**  -0.064 -0.065 -0.064 
    (-3.26) (-2.60) (-1.21) (-1.19) (-1.19) 




      (1.14) (2.96) (2.89) (2.85) 





      (-8.02) (-5.42) (-5.47) (-5.60) 




      (-1.79)  (-1.78)  (-1.77) 
poor_unfair      0.097  0.078  0.090 
      (0.81)  (0.59)  (0.69) 
child_unselfish       0.037  0.028 
       (1.26)  (0.98) 
trust        0.168
*** 
        ( 5 . 7 5 )  
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  113310 109556 106760  34680  33849  32850 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
7. Conclusion 
The present study corroborates earlier findings on determinants of preferences for 
redistribution using survey data in breadth (across countries) and depth (across time) so far 
not applied to this question. Accordingly, it is possible to distinguish determinants that are 
valid either only in OECD countries or only in non-OECD countries or universally in one 
hundred nations around the world. Also, different hypotheses on determinants of preferences 
for redistribution are jointly tested to prevent missing variable bias and get an idea about 
possible substitutive relations between respective potential determinants.  
In line with basic economic reasoning and previous empirical research, discussed in 
section 2, the analysis confirms that higher incomes and higher educational attainments 
reduce the support for redistribution. This result is highly robust and true on a global scale. A 
similar robust and universal validity is found for the social rivalry effect and the perception of 
individual control and autonomy. There is some support for the social identity hypothesis, 
which states that national identification might decrease the support for redistribution. The 
social identity hypothesis however is not robust to all variations in specification and sample 
size.  
In the OECD being self-employed is a significant and robust predictor for weaker 
preferences for redistributions. Also important are subjective beliefs about the reasons for   38
poverty. While the idea that poverty results from laziness is not robust to all specifications, 
the belief that poverty results from an unfair society consistently, significantly and robustly 
increases support for redistribution. The effect of altruism has some weak, but not robust 
support from the data. While the belief that success is a matter of luck has no effect, the belief 
that hard work results in success decreases support for redistribution in most, but not in all 
estimated models. The same is true for religious activity and marriage which are both 
hypothesised to provide some substitute for social insurance. However, while there are 
significant results for some specifications, theses are not robust over all steps of the analysis.    
Besides the already mentioned commonalities, there are considerable differences for 
non-OECD countries: Self-employment, marriage and religion show no statistical effect 
whatsoever. Beliefs about the reasons for poverty have significant effects if individually 
added to the socioeconomic controls. However, these effects are not robust to the inclusion of 
additional focus variables. This is also true for our measure of altruism. Individually included, 
altruism has a significant positive effect on the support for redistribution. There is however no 
effect if additional focus variables are added. Both, the opinion that success is the result of 
hard work and that it is a matter of luck, significantly decrease the support for redistribution. 
The meaning of this is hard to interpret. Finally, in the non-OECD countries a robust positive 
effect of retirement emerges from the data.  
The present study identifies income, education, social class and the subjective 
perception of autonomy and control over life as universal determinants for preferences about 
income inequality and implicitly about redistribution. An important next step is to understand 
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Appendix I 
 
Table A1. Year – wave structure of WVS/EVS data. 
year  1 2 3 4 5 6  Total 
        
1981  14,827  0 0 0 0 0  14,827 
1982  8,008  0 0 0 0 0  8,008 
1983  467  0 0 0 0 0  467 
1984  1,932  0 0 0 0 0  1,932 
1989  0  2,336  0 0 0 0  2,336 
1990  0  50,805  0 0 0 0  50,805 
1991  0  7,417  0 0 0 0  7,417 
1992  0  1,035  0 0 0 0  1,035 
1993  0  1,103  0 0 0 0  1,103 
1994  0 0  780  0 0 0  780 
1995  0 0  16,671  0 0 0  16,671 
1996  0 0  33,122  0 0 0  33,122 
1997  0 0  14,173  0 0 0  14,173 
1998  0 0  12,600  0 0 0  12,600 
1999  0 0  1,254  41,367  0 0  42,621 
2000  0 0 0  18,025  0 0  18,025 
2001  0 0 0  31,573  0 0  31,573 
2002  0 0 0  6,300  0 0  6,300 
2003  0 0 0  2,544  0 0  2,544 
2004  0 0 0  2,325  933  0  3,258 
2005  0 0 0 0  18,385  0  18,385 
2006  0 0 0 0  32,050  0  32,050 
2007  0 0 0 0  24,447  0  24,447 
2008  0 0 0 0  7,076  55,878  62,954 
2009  0 0 0 0 0  9,988  9,988 
        
Total  25,234 62,696 78,600  102,134  82,891 65,866  417,421 
Note: Numbers indicate numbers of observations surveyed in the respective year, full sample. 
 
 
Table A2. OLS estimation of Cumulate M6 (as shown in Table 13) 




** 0.009  0.009  0.008 




*** -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 








  (5.77) (5.70) (5.82) (6.72) (6.57) (6.49) 
edu_prime -0.109
* -0.091 -0.076 -0.097 -0.090 -0.060 




























** -0.071  -0.067  -0.038 
  (-3.16) (-2.54) (-3.01) (-1.36) (-1.28) (-0.64) 
stat_divorced -0.114
+ -0.101 -0.105
+ -0.001  0.007  0.043 
  (-1.95) (-1.61) (-1.72) (-0.01) (0.06)  (0.37) 
stat_widowed -0.063 -0.039 -0.066 -0.023 -0.016 0.009 
  (-0.74) (-0.48) (-0.87) (-0.23) (-0.16) (0.10)   44
jobstat_part 0.107  0.122
+ 0.121
+ -0.070 -0.065 -0.083 















  (2.30) (2.24) (2.37) (1.77) (1.78) (1.62) 




  (-0.98) (-1.04) (-1.05) (-2.04) (-2.04) (-2.09) 
jobstat_student 0.110  0.144
* 0.149
* 0.059 0.058 0.070 
  (1.41) (2.27) (2.32) (0.60) (0.60) (0.71) 
jobstat_unemp 0.112
+ 0.092 0.096
+ 0.078 0.081 0.087 
  (1.85) (1.65) (1.72) (0.85) (0.87) (0.95) 
jobstat_other -0.094 -0.098 -0.078 -0.060 -0.068 -0.029 











* 0.078 0.080 0.083 




*** -0.139  -0.138  -0.152
+ 















  (-5.12) (-5.09) (-4.70) (-1.92) (-1.85) (-1.63) 
religion_reg -0.098
* -0.083
+ -0.079 -0.020 -0.016 -0.007 
















  (-5.37) (-5.52) (-5.44) (-4.81) (-4.91) (-5.05) 
class_lower 0.126 0.118 0.094  -0.018  -0.022  -0.025 
 (1.12)  (1.03)  (0.83)  (-0.12)  (-0.15)  (-0.16) 
proud_bin1   -0.188
* -0.182
* -0.039 -0.038 -0.043 
    (-2.62) (-2.32) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.51) 
control_bin2    0.167
** 0.105  0.113  0.111 
     (2.91)  (1.35)  (1.43)  (1.47) 





      (-4.10) (-3.28) (-3.32) (-3.52) 
poor_lazy       -0.090  -0.089  -0.094 
       (-1.20)  (-1.19)  (-1.28) 




       (9.91)  (10.12)  (10.66) 
child_unselfish       0.153
* 0.157
** 
       (2.64)  (2.98) 
trust        0.057 








  (24.54) (22.77) (13.59) (21.12) (20.82) (19.65) 
Country  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  54807 51349 50143 21688 21672 21160 
Notes: OLS regression with equal-income as dependent variable; t statistics in parentheses; 
+ p < 0.10, 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
Table A3. Descriptive Statistics – non-OECD Sample 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Mean-
OECD  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
equal__income 196712  4.904  5.516  3.083 1 10 
equal_income_bin2 196712  0.183  0.196  0.387 0  1 
equal_income_bin9 196712  0.278  0.158  0.448 0  1   45
           
female 216425  0.523  0.529  0.499 0  1 
age 215024  40.132  44.287  15.910 15 100 
age_sqr 215024  1863.701  2260.769  1450.041 225 10000 
           
edu_no 201334  0.145  0.063  0.352 0  1 
edu_prime 201334  0.182  0.243  0.386 0  1 
edu_somesec 201334  0.246 0.233  0.431 0  1 
edu_sec 201334  0.273  0.300  0.445 0  1 
edu_uni 201334  0.155  0.161  0.362 0  1 
           
stat_married 212825  0.631 0.623  0.483 0  1 
stat_divorced 212825  0.047 0.068  0.211 0  1 
stat_widowed 212825  0.069 0.075  0.254 0  1 
stat_single 212825  0.253  0.233  0.435 0  1 
           
jobstat_full 210296  0.350  0.411  0.477 0  1 
jobstat_part 210296  0.067  0.076  0.250 0  1 
jobstat_self 210296  0.109  0.068  0.311 0  1 
jobstat_retired 210296  0.119  0.184  0.324 0  1 
jobstat_wife 210296  0.143 0.127  0.350 0  1 
jobstat_student 210296  0.080  0.060  0.271 0  1 
jobstat_unemp 210296  0.114  0.056  0.318 0  1 
jobstat_other 210296  0.020 0.019  0.139 0  1 
           
inc_quint1 192161  0.295  0.197  0.456 0  1 
inc_quint2 192161  0.289  0.284  0.453 0  1 
inc_quint3 192161  0.237  0.239  0.425 0  1 
inc_quint4 192161  0.129  0.176  0.336 0  1 
inc_quint5 192161  0.049  0.103  0.215 0  1 
           
religion_never 202663  0.265  0.403  0.441 0  1 
religion_some 202663  0.273  0.268  0.446 0  1 
religion_reg 202663  0.462  0.329  0.499 0  1 
           
class_upper 156427  0.176  0.189  0.381 0  1 
class_middle 156427  0.370 0.355  0.483 0  1 
class_working 156427  0.282  0.317  0.450 0  1 
class_lower 156427  0.172  0.139  0.377 0  1 
           
proud_bin1 206690  0.595  0.491  0.491 0  1 
trust 207038  0.236  0.350  0.425 0  1 
child_unselfish 212013  0.290  0.279  0.454 0  1 
poor_lazy 99260  0.282  0.276  0.450 0  1 
poor_unfair 99260  0.533  0.402  0.499 0  1 
control_no 204380  0.080  0.046  0.272 0  1 
control_yes 204380  0.269  0.240  0.444 0  1 
success_work 111851  0.394 0.278  0.489 0  1 
success_luck 111851  0.124 0.098  0.329 0  1 
           
child_present 202719  0.730 0.744  0.444 0  1 
politic_left_bin2 138220 0.117  0.076  0.322 0  1 
politic_right_bin9 138220  0.156  0.082  0.363 0  1 
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Appendix II –Variable Coding 
 




female  coded 1 of respondent reports sex “female” 
age  -in WVS age is provided in variable x003 
-in EVS age is calculated: age=year of survey – year born 
 
Education (WVS: x025): “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” 
edu_no  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Inadequately completed elementary education' 
edu_prime  coded 1 if respondent states: (2) 'Completed (compulsory) elementary 
education' or (3) 'Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational 
type/(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification' 
edu_somesec  coded 1 if respondent states: (4) 'Complete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type/Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification' or 
(5) 'Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary, intermediate 
general qualification' 
edu_sec  coded 1 if respondent states: (6) 'Complete secondary: university-preparatory 
type/Full secondary, maturity level certificate' or (7) 'Some university without 
degree/Higher education - lower-level tertiary certificate' 
edu_uni  coded 1 if respondent states: (8) 'University with degree/Higher education - 
upper-level tertiary certificate' 
Education (EVS: v336): “What is the highest level you have completed in your education?” 
edu_no  coded 1 if respondent states: (0) 'Pre-primary education or none education' 
edu_prime  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Primary education or first stage of basic 
education' 
edu_somesec  coded 1 if respondent states: (2) 'Lower secondary or second stage of basic 
education' 
edu_sec  coded 1 if respondent states: (3) ' (Upper) secondary education' or (4) 'Post-
secondary non-tertiary education' 
edu_uni  coded 1 if respondent states: (5) 'First stage of tertiary education' or (6) 'Second 
stage of tertiary education' 
 
Income (WVS: x047): “Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your 
household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.” 
inc_quint1  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) "Lower step" or (2) "second step" 
inc_quint2  coded 1 if respondent states: (3) "Third step" or (4) "Fourth step" 
inc_quint3  coded 1 if respondent states: (5) "Fifth step" or (6) "Sixth step" 
inc_quint4  coded 1 if respondent states: (7) "Seventh step" or (8) "Eighth step" 
inc_quint5  coded 1 if respondent states: (9) "Ninth step" or (10) "Tenth step" 
Income (EVS: v353): “Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know what group your 
household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.” 
inc_quint1  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) "Lower step" or (2) "second step" or (3) "Third 
step" 
inc_quint2  coded 1 if respondent states: (4) " Fourth step" or (5) "Fifth step" 
inc_quint3  coded 1 if respondent states: (6) " Sixth step" or (7) "Seventh step" 
inc_quint4  coded 1 if respondent states: (8) or (9)  
inc_quint5  coded 1 if respondent states: (10) or (11) or (12)  
 
Marriage status (WVS: x007 EVS: v313) “Are you currently…” 
stat_married  coded 1 if respondent states: married or registered partnership  
stat_single  coded 1 if respondent states: 'Single/Never married' or never registered   47
partnership 
stat_divorced  coded 1 if respondent states: separated or divorced 
stat_widowed  coded 1 if respondent states: widowed  
 
Labour market status (WVS: x028): Are you employed now or not? IF YES: About how many hours a 
week? If more than one job: only for the main job 
jobstat_full  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Full time' 
jobstat_part  coded 1 if respondent states: (2) 'Part time' 
jobstat_self  coded 1 if respondent states: (3) 'Self employed' 
jobstat_retired  coded 1 if respondent states: (4) 'Retired' 
jobstat_wife  coded 1 if respondent states: (5) 'Housewife' 
jobstat_student  coded 1 if respondent states: (6) 'Students' 
jobstat_unemp  coded 1 if respondent states: (7) 'Unemployed' 
jobstat_other  coded 1 if respondent states: (8) 'Other'  
Labour market status (EVS: v337): Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please 
select from the card the employment status that applies to you 
jobstat_full  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) ’30 hours a week or more’ 
jobstat_part  coded 1 if respondent states: (2) ‘Less than 30 hours a week’ 
jobstat_self  coded 1 if respondent states: (3) 'Self employed' 
jobstat_retired  coded 1 if respondent states: (5) 'Retired/pensioned' 
jobstat_wife  coded 1 if respondent states: (6) 'Housewife not otherwise employed' 
jobstat_student  coded 1 if respondent states: (7) 'Student' 
jobstat_unemp  coded 1 if respondent states: (8) 'Unemployed' 
jobstat_other  coded 1 if respondent states: (9) ‘Disabled’ or 10 'Other'  
 
Religion (WVS: f028 EVS: v109): Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often 
do you attend religious services these days? 
religion_never  coded 1 if respondent states: 'Less often' or 'Never, practically never' 
religion_some  coded 1 if respondent states: 'Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days' 
or 'Other specific holy days' or 'Once a year' 
religion_reg  coded 1 if respondent states: 'More than once a week' or 'Once a week' or 'Once 
a month' 
 
Fairness of the allocation mechanism (only WVS: e040): How would you place your views on this 
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; (10) means you agree completely 
with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can chose any 
number in between.  
(1) 'In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life' , … 
(10) 'Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - it’s more a matter of luck and connections' 
hard_work numeric  variable coded 1 to 10 as e040  
success_work  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'In the long run, hard work usually brings a 
better life' or (2) 
success_luck  coded 1 if respondent states: (10) 'Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - 
it’s more a matter of luck and connections' or (9) 
 
Social Class (only WVS: x045): People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working 
class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 
(1) 'Upper class' (2) 'Upper middle class' (3) 'Lower middle class' (4) 'Working class' (5) 'Lower class'  
Social Class (only WVS: x046): Socio-economic status of respondent.  
(1) 'AB Upper/Upper middle class', (2) 'C1 Middle, no manual workers', (3) 'C2 Middle, manual 
workers', (4) 'DE Manual workers/Unskilled, unemployed'  
class_upper  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Upper class' or (2) 'Upper middle class' 
class_middle  coded 1 if respondent states: (3) 'Lower middle class' or  (2) 'C1 Middle, no 
manual workers' 
class_working  coded 1 if respondent states: (4) 'Working class' or (3) 'C2 Middle, manual   48
workers' 
class_lower  coded 1 if respondent states: (5) 'Lower class' or (4) 'DE Manual workers / 
Unskilled, unemployed'  
 
Social Identity (WVS: g006): How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 
Social Identity (EVS: v256): How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen? 
proud_bin1  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Very proud' 
 
Moral worth of the poor (WVS: e131): Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live 
in need? Here are two opinions: Which comes closest to your view? (1) 'Poor because of laziness and 
lack of will power', (2) 'Poor because of an unfair society', (3) 'Other answer' 
poor_lazy  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Poor because of laziness and lack of will 
power' 
poor_unfair  coded 1 if respondent states: (2) 'Poor because of an unfair society' 
 
Moral worth of poor (WVS: e190 EVS: v67): Why are there people in this country who live in need? 
Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important?  
(1) 'Unlucky', (2) 'Laziness or lack of willpower', (3) 'Injustice in society', (4) 'Part modern progress', 
(5) 'None of these' 
poor_lazy  coded 1 if respondent states: (2) 'Laziness or lack of willpower' 
poor_unfair  coded 1 if respondent states: (3) 'Injustice in society' 
 
Subjective freedom and autonomy (WVS: a173; EVS: v65): Some people feel they have completely 
free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on 
what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" 
to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns 
out.  
control  coded like original variable 
control_no  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) "none at all" or (2) 
control_yes  coded 1 if respondent states: (10) "a great deal" or non 
 
Altruism (WVS: a041 EVS: v179): Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn 
at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.  
child_unselfish   coded 1 if respondent states: unselfishness 
 
Trust (WVS: a165 EVS: v62): Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
trust  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Most people can be trusted' 
 
Child present (WVS: x011): Have you had any children? If yes, how many? 
Child present (EVS: v321): How many children do you have? 
child_present  coded 1 if respondent states: one or more 
 
Political ideology (WVS: e033 EVS: v193): In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the 
right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (1) 'Left' – (10) 'Right' 
politic_left_bin2  coded 1 if respondent states: (1) 'Left' or (2) 
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